EXPLORING THE SHORT- AND LONG-RUN LINKS FROM BANK COMPETITION TO RISK – RECONCILING CONFLICTING HYPOTHESES? by Davis, EP & karim, D
  
EXPLORING THE SHORT- AND 
LONG-RUN LINKS FROM 
BANK COMPETITION TO RISK 
– RECONCILING CONFLICTING 
HYPOTHESES? 
Using a dataset for the EU-27 covering 1998-2012, this is one of the first studies of banking 
competition and risk to look at the dynamics of the relation between these variables, to take account 
of a full 6 year period since the onset of the crisis in 2007, as well as a comparable period before it; 
and to compare and contrast results using two competition indicators, the H statistic and the Lerner 
index. Using the H statistics, we find that in the crucial pre crisis period, the change in competition 
has a positive effect on risk (measured by the Z Score), while there is a overall negative effect of the 
level of competition on risk. The Lerner index provides results supportive of the hypothesis that there 
are dynamic relations between competition and risk, in that the change in the Lerner index again 
correlates positively with risk (i.e. narrower margins when competition increases make banks 
weaker) while the long run effect of heightened competition is also to increase risk. Testing for the 
reason for differences in long run effects we find that the H and Lerner differ in their impact on the 
volatility of profits, a key input to the Z Score risk indicator. There are important implications for the 
interpretation of results in the literature based on these different indicators. 
Discussion Paper No. 421 
Date: 17th December 2013 
 
Name: E Philip Davis and Dilruba Karim, NIESR and Brunel University 
    
17th December 2013 
EXPLORING THE SHORT- AND LONG-RUN LINKS FROM BANK 
COMPETITION TO RISK – RECONCILING CONFLICTING 
HYPOTHESES? 
 
 
E Philip Davis and Dilruba Karim,  
NIESR and Brunel University1 
London 
 
 
Abstract: Using a dataset for the EU-27 covering 1998-2012, this is one of the first studies of 
banking competition and risk to look at the dynamics of the relation between these 
variables, to take account of a full 6 year period since the onset of the crisis in 2007, as well 
as a comparable period before it; and to compare and contrast results using two 
competition indicators, the H statistic and the Lerner index. Using the H statistics, we find 
that in the crucial pre crisis period, the change in competition has a positive effect on risk 
(measured by the Z Score), while there is a overall negative effect of the level of competition 
on risk. The Lerner index provides results supportive of the hypothesis that there are 
dynamic relations between competition and risk, in that the change in the Lerner index again 
correlates positively with risk (i.e. narrower margins when competition increases make 
banks weaker) while the long run effect of heightened competition is also to increase risk. 
Testing for the reason for differences in long run effects we find that the H and Lerner differ 
in their impact on the volatility of profits, a key input to the Z Score risk indicator. There are 
important implications for the interpretation of results in the literature based on these 
different indicators. 
Keywords: Bank competition, financial stability, EU banking markets, Lerner index, Panzar-
Rosse H Statistic, Z Score 
JEL Classification: G21, G28
                                                     
1 We thank Angus Armstrong, Ray Barrell, Thorsten Beck, Jaap Bikker, Jerry Caprio, Dawn Holland, Iana Liadze 
Phil Molyneux and Pawel Paluchowski for assistance and advice. The errors remain our own responsibility. This 
paper was prepared under ESRC Project No ES/K008056/1 entitled “The Future of Banking”. 
2 
 
Introduction 
The subject of bank competition and risk has returned to the fore with the financial crisis of 
2008-9, with a common view being that competition between financial institutions during 
the preceding boom was at the core of the crisis. This in turn implies that the benefits of 
banking competition for economic growth and efficiency need to be placed in the balance. 
On the other hand, there is an extensive literature, generally estimated on pre crisis data, 
which finds conflicting results on the relation between competition and risk. This follows on 
the one hand the so-called “franchise value” or “competition-fragility” approach – that more 
competition reduces the value of a banking licence and requires firms to take more risk as a 
result; and on the other hand, the “competition-stability” view that with low levels of 
competition banks may charge excessively high rates of interest on loans and hence 
generate adverse selection and moral hazard on their loan books. Both types of results have 
been found in the empirical literature, with also an emerging set of studies suggesting both 
high and low levels of competition may be adverse for risk i.e. there is a “u” shaped 
relationship, and that structural and regulatory features may affect the country level trade-
off.  
A further ambiguity is introduced by the common use of concentration of a banking system 
as a proxy for competition, when in fact the theory of contestable markets suggests a 
concentrated system may be highly competitive if there is sufficient potential competition 
from outside, as may be permitted by regulations allowing new entry as in the EU Single 
Market. The existing empirical literature mainly covers the period up to 2007 thus leaving 
open the interpretation of the post 2008-9 crisis world where there are a diminishing 
number of banks, extensive government intervention and – many would argue - less 
competition. The existing literature also suggests there are untested assumptions behind 
proposals for enforced structural change in banking such as the Vickers proposal in the UK. 
In this paper, we estimate indices of banking market competition for the UK and other EU 
countries and then relate them to banking risk. Our aim is to establish whether and to what 
extent competition and its trade-off with risk has changed with the financial crisis and the 
more concentrated market structure that has ensued. We test for dynamic as well as long 
run links from competition to risk. Mainly we use the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic to assess the 
changing nature of competition in individual markets over time. Among earlier studies using 
this approach is an analysis of competition in the major EMU countries as compared to the 
US just prior to EMU (De Bandt and Davis 2001). We also investigate the alternative 
approaches to measuring competition of Iwata’s Lerner Indices (Bikker 2004). 
The work is structured as follows. In the first section we briefly examine the theoretical 
literature and look in more detail at recent empirical work on competition and risk in 
banking, highlighting that the datasets used are largely during the boom period or before, 
with very little work on the post crisis period. We note that empirical as well as theoretical 
work are often contradictory, and seek to probe the reasons why. We question for example, 
whether global  datasets are fully informative for policy in advanced countries. In the 
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following section, we outline our data and methodology used in the exercise, before going 
on to our empirical results. We have a two step approach with an estimation of the levels of 
competition in each market being followed by a test of their impact on risk, dividing 
between static and dynamic aspects and between results from the H Statistic and the Lerner 
statistic. The final section draws conclusions. 
1 Literature survey 
As mentioned, there are two broad approaches to the relation between banking competition 
and risk. The theory of franchise value (Keeley 1990) or “competition-fragility” suggests that 
institutions in an uncompetitive banking system have incentives to avoid risk because a 
banking licence is valuable in such a context with restricted entry and probably large capital 
cushions (technically, the franchise value is high due to monopoly rents). This typified the 
highly-regulated situation of banking systems from the war to the late 20th Century where 
banks had a great deal of market power and there was little financial instability. Then, when 
there is deregulation, the value of the licence declines as excess returns are competed away 
by new entrants (also from abroad where permitted) and by more intense competition 
between existing players. This gives incentives to increase balance sheet risk in order to 
recover the previous level of profitability as banks in effect shift risks to depositors (or 
deposit insurers) and banks thus become more vulnerable to shocks. In a context of limited 
liability, there is also asymmetric risk for owners and managers, which may increase the 
positive effect of competition on risk. This effect may be intensified by an incentive to 
underinvest in screening and monitoring since information rents from lending relationships 
are less valuable, as customers can switch banks more readily (Allen and Gale 2000, 2004). 
Meanwhile, larger banks in a less competitive system may be better able to diversify risks 
and are easier to supervise (Allen and Gale 2000, World Bank 2013). 
The alternative approach, which is due to Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) is often called the 
“competition-stability” approach. Whereas lower lending rates in competitive banking 
markets increase scope for borrowers to repay, higher lending rates in uncompetitive 
markets lead to adverse selection with only the riskier borrowers seeking funds and moral 
hazard inducing borrowing firms to take higher risk (as in Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). With 
perfect correlation of loan defaults, this naturally affects the entire portfolio.  Large banks in 
uncompetitive markets may also be harder to supervise (Beck et al 2006) and vulnerable 
both to contagion and to “too-big-to-fail” incentives for risk taking which can enhance the 
competition-stability effect (Mishkin 1998). 
An extension of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) allowing for imperfect correlation in loan defaults 
can instead generate a U shaped relation between risk and competition (Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo 2010) as the initial benefit to lower probabilities of default from lower loan rates 
(risk shifting effect) begins to be offset by lower revenues (margin effect), leading to 
instability. Wagner (2010) shows that if banks can adjust their loan portfolios, the link from 
competition to risk taking may be reversed as for example when borrowers become safer, 
banks choose to shift their portfolio to higher risk borrowers per se. There may be 
4 
 
overcompensation in fact due to loss of franchise value from competition. Meanwhile, 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) show that the effect of capital adequacy on risk taking 
depends on whether the market is subject to competition-stability or competition-fragility, 
since capital requirements reduce competition, raise interest rates and may lead banks to 
choose more correlated loan portfolios. Berger et al (2009) argue that even if loss of market 
power induces riskier loan portfolios, charter values may not fall if banks protect themselves 
with higher equity, lower risk securities or use of credit derivatives – this may help to 
reconcile the two hypotheses. 
In the empirical literature, as summarised in Table 1 below, results are mixed for country 
studies, and it seems that cross country work can give a richer indication of the risk-
competition relationship. In effect, cross country work seeks to find the average relation 
between competition and stability for a set of countries while controlling for country-specific 
factors. There remains an issue of how homogeneous or heterogeneous the country groups 
are, however. 
There are typically two types of dependent variable, namely banking crises per se (as in Beck 
et al 2006 and Cihak and Schaeck 2010) and bank indicators of risk, typically the Z-Score (as 
in Beck et al 2013) measures the number of standard deviations a banks’ rate of return on 
assets must fall for the bank to become insolvent. The Z score is more comprehensive as a 
measure of bank risk than measures such as NPL ratios which only measure loan market risk, 
and is bank-by-bank in contrast to banking crises which are of course country wide. As noted 
by Lui et al (2013) it in effect combines a measure of bank performance (ROA), a measure of 
risk (standard deviation of ROA) and a measure of safety and soundness (equity/asset ratio). 
Tabak et al (2012) use a variant of Z-Score which assesses the potential stability of the bank 
where the Z-Score is the dependent variable of a translog production frontier. 
Anginer et al (2012) use a relative distance to default measure where the “distance to 
default” is the difference between the firm’s asset value and the face value of its debt, 
scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value; Fu et al (2014) use a similar 
measure. Meanwhile, the “relative” aspect is derived by looking at correlations of changes in 
this measure, thus capturing systemic rather than individual stability. However, unlike Z-
Score this can only be calculated for publicly traded banks. Relevant results for competition 
and risk also arise from estimates of determination of capital ratios (such as Schaeck and 
Cihak 2012), while in a merger study, Weiss et al (2012) use as a risk measures the “marginal 
expected shortfall” and “lower tail dependence” between a merged bank’s stock returns and 
a sector index. 
Measures of competition (CEPR 2010) include simple concentration measures such as the 
Herfindahl index, and many studies have used concentration as a key right-hand side 
variable (Beck et al 2006). Concentration is clearly of policy interest in the context of banking 
mergers in the wake of the EU Single Market and also consolidation since the sub-prime 
crisis. However, concentration measures do not allow for contestability, ownership structure 
and the possible reverse causality from behaviour to structure (efficient structure 
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hypothesis). Furthermore they may omit the impact of cross border competition that is key 
in the EU Single Market. In effect, the theory underlying use of concentration measures is 
that market structure influences behaviour (structure-conduct-performance) which the 
“New Industrial Organisation” theory has shown to be only partially the case (Tirole 1988). 
More relevant may be the contestability of markets, whereby potential “hit and run” entry 
provides a limit to anti competitive behaviour of incumbents, regardless of the degree of 
concentration; such potential entry is facilitated when sunk costs of entry (those which 
cannot be recovered when exiting the market) are low. Arguably, technological changes such 
as internet banking as well as easing of regulation affecting competition such as the EU 
Single Market has made banking markets more contestable over time. 
The Panzar-Rosse H statistic, which we use as a key measure in our own work, overcomes 
some of these issues by giving a market wide measure of contestability (response of output 
to input prices), see De Bandt and Davis (2001), Bikker et al (2012). In perfect competition, 
increases in input prices translate direct to total revenue and marginal cost but this is not 
true for imperfect competition. H is thus 1 for perfect competition,, 0 for imperfect 
competition and -1 for monopoly. However, in principle this measure is only accurate for a 
market in equilibrium (this can be tested via estimation of the impact of input prices on 
return on assets, see Schaeck et al 2009).  
The alternative Lerner Index (Bikker 2004) shows the ratio of price to marginal cost and can 
be calculated bank by bank whereas the H Index is a banking-system property. The scope of 
competition is indicated by the size of the index as zero would show perfect competition 
while one implies monopoly. However, Lerner must be correctly adjusted for lending risk 
and may be correlated with the Z Score as a dependent variable (Beck et al (2013) seek to 
take this into account). Fu et al (2014) use as a variant the efficiency adjusted Lerner which 
allows for the possibility that in uncompetitive markets, monopoly rents may be reflected in 
inefficiency instead of high profits (Koetter et al 2012). Some recent studies use the Boone 
indicator (Boone 2008) which focuses on the impact of competition on structure, as banks 
that are efficient gain market share and the inefficient lose it. The indicator is the elasticity 
of market share with respect to marginal cost. 
In this context, using global data on 50 countries and the Panzar-Rosse approach, Claessens 
and Laeven (2004) show countries that permit foreign bank entry and have lesser activity 
and entry restrictions are more competitive, while they do not find the expected negative 
link from concentration to competition, implying that contestability is key. World Bank 
(2013) also probes the factors underlying competition, this time using the Lerner Index for 
83 countries and finds again that it is driven by contestability (lower entry barriers), 
information disclosure, better institutions, foreign bank participation and more liquid stock 
markets – and not by concentration. 
Usually studies control for a number of bank and country level variables in investigating 
competition-risk relations such as bank size, leverage and profitability (see for example Beck 
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et al 2013), and structural and regulatory variables (such as private monitoring, restrictions 
on entry and government ownership, see Barth et al (2012)). 
Individual country results of interest include Craig and Dinger (2009) for the US who 
estimate simultaneously for bank risk, retail funding competition and wholesale rates bank 
by bank to probe their interrelationship, finding a positive relation between deposit market 
competition and risk. Dell’Ariccia et al (2012) show that lending standards in the US 
subprime boom were positively linked to competition, as a higher local Herfindahl index or 
number of lenders would make for less risky lending with more loan denials in more 
competitive markets. Jimenez et al (2010) using a sample of Spanish banks show that 
whereas there is no detectable relation between concentration and risk, there is a positive 
link between competition as measured by Lerner indices, and bank risk especially in the loan 
market (NPLs), hence supporting the franchise value theory (albeit not for bank-wide risk 
given that NPLs only indicate loan market risk). 
Some cross country studies suggest that more concentrated banking systems are more 
stable, implying a benefit to consolidation (Beck et al 2006, Schaeck et al 2009) although 
they also find a positive impact of competition per se, suggesting an effect of contestability 
(i.e. a competitive but concentrated system owing to potential competition) and contrary to 
the franchise value theory. A weakness of Schaeck et al (2009) is that the H-statistic is 
considered constant from 1980-2005, and their “time-to-crisis” variable may be affected by 
the onset of deregulation in the different markets. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) show that 
concentration in EU countries measured by the Herfindahl and 5-firm indices raised bank risk 
as indicated by aggregate Z-Scores over 1997-2005. In contrast, Yeyati and Micco (2007) 
looking at Latin America found that increased concentration appears to have had no 
influence on competition or fragility, while foreign penetration weakened banking 
competition, which is negatively related with bank risk and that, as a result of the previous 
two findings, foreign penetration induced lower levels of risk. They suggest that foreign 
banks are seen as imperfect substitutes for domestic ones. Liu et al (2012) examine four 
South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam) and find 
concentration is inversely related to bank risk whereas regulatory restrictions positively 
influence bank risk-taking. Competition measured by the H statistic does not increase bank 
risk-taking behaviour. 
Some banking merger studies are relevant to assessing competition and risk. Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2011) using a distance to default measure of risk show increases in risk during 
mergers are particularly large for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals in the EU. 
Meanwhile, Weiss et al (2012) find that mergers typically raise merged banks’ and their 
competitors' contributions to systemic risk, although this effect is magnified for regulator-
driven mergers during the financial crisis. This raises the question whether demergers as in 
the UK Vickers proposals would reduce risk (see Armstrong 2012). Relatedly, Barrell et al 
(2010) find large banks tended to have riskier loan portfolios as measured by NPLs and 
provisions although this could be offset by diversification. Gropp et al (2013) find that 
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government bailout probabilities (measured using ratings information) raise the risk level of 
competitor banks and of government owned banks. 
Banks in more competitive systems may hold more capital to compensate for risks (Berger et 
al 2009, Schaeck and Cihak 2012). Berger et al (2009) find that consistent with competition-
fragility, banks with more market power have less overall risk exposure, while on the other 
hand in line with competition-stability, market power does increase loan risk in such 
countries, compensated by higher capital and other risk mitigating methods. Aggregate 
prudential ratios including those linked to competition such as return on equity may be able 
to help in identifying weak banking sectors (Cihak and Schaeck 2010). 
Corresponding at a global level with Craig and Dinger (2009), Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) show that banking systems that rely to a high degree on non-deposit financing and 
non-interest income generation are more risky according to the Z-Score, even during the 
Great Moderation (the dataset covers 1999-2007). Before the 2007-9 crisis, the banks 
diversifying funding and income sources in this risk-increasing manner tended to be the large 
and fastest growing banks. This work gives some support to the argument of Vickers for 
separation of wholesale and retail banking. Dewally and Shao (2013) show that procyclicality 
of bank leverage is related to asset growth but also to wholesale funding use, especially for 
advanced country banks in the run-up to the financial crisis within their sample 1990-2007. 
Anginer et al (2012) look, as noted, at the co-dependence of risks across banks by using a 
relative distance to default measure, noting that Z-Scores are correlated with the Lerner 
index and show risk only for individual banks not the system. They find greater competition 
leads to less risk owing to more diversified balance sheets, while concentration and market 
power increase fragility. Some studies find a nonlinear relationship between competition 
and risk, with Tabak et al (2012) for Latin America finding that high and low competition 
reduce fragility, using a stability efficiency measure of risk based on Z-Score and the 
efficiency frontier. Bank size and capital of large banks is a benefit for banks under 
competitive conditions, and capital is a benefit of the system in the case of collusive 
conditions. 
A number of studies see regulation as a key addition factor underlying the competition-
stability link. For example Anginer et al (2012) find that tighter entry barriers and activity 
restrictions increase fragility ceteris paribus. Lack of foreign ownership, weak investor 
protection, and poor standards of supervision and regulation are indicators of a stronger 
effect of lack of competition on fragility. Beck et al (2006) in an earlier paper also found that 
restrictions on entry and activities promoted instability. Schaeck and Cihak (2012) use 
regulatory variables as instruments to account for endogeneity of competition to capital 
ratios; market power endogeneity is also tested in studies such as Berger et al (2009) and 
Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009). 
In one of the most recent papers on a global sample, Beck et al (2013) seek to control for 
structural and regulatory factors and hence test for heterogeneity in the global cross-country 
relationship. They find that the franchise value (competition-risk) effect dominates the 
8 
 
competition-stability effect but in some cases the opposite is true and some structural and 
regulatory factors may be cited to distinguish between them. In sum, the effect of higher 
competition on bank fragility is greater with stronger activity restrictions (contrary to 
Vickers), lower systemic fragility (measured by country level Z-Score), more developed stock 
exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and better credit information sharing.  
We summarise the studies cited in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Summary of recent work on competition and risk in banking 
Study 
(date) 
Dependent Competition 
variable 
Data set Date of 
sample 
Key result 
Anginer et 
al (2012) 
Distance to default Lerner index Global bank by 
bank (publicly 
quoted 
institutions) 
1996-
2009 
Competition 
enhances 
stability 
Beck et al 
(2006) 
Banking crises Concentration, 
competition 
related 
regulations 
Global 
macroeconomic 
1980-
1997 
More 
concentrated 
systems have 
less crises 
Beck et al 
(2013) 
z-Score, sd ROA, 
E/TA 
Lerner index Global bank by 
bank (1600 US 
banks only) 
1994-
2009 
The 
competition 
risk trade-off 
varies with 
structural and 
regulatory 
conditions 
Berger et al 
(2009) 
Z Score, NPLs, 
E/TA 
Lerner and 
concentration 
(loans and 
deposits) 
Advanced 
countries (91% 
US banks) 
1999-
2005 
Banks with 
more market 
power take less 
risk overall but 
more loan risk 
Cihak and 
Schaeck 
(2010) 
Banking crises Financial 
Soundness 
Indicators (FSI’s) 
Global 
macroeconomic 
1994-
2007 
Some FSI’s can 
help identify 
incipient 
systemic risks 
Craig and 
Dinger 
(2009) 
Z Score Deposit rates US banks 1997-
2006 
Deposit market 
competition 
raises risk 
Demirguc 
Kunt and 
Huizinga 
(2010) 
Z Score Non deposit 
funding share and 
fee income share 
Global bank by 
bank 
1995-
2007 
Non-traditional 
funding and 
lending 
enhance risk 
Fu et al 
(2014) 
Z Score, 
probability of 
bankruptcy 
Lerner indices, 
concentration 
Asia-Pacific bank 
by bank 
2003-
2010 
Lower pricing 
power 
enhances risk 
exposure while 
concentration 
reduces risk 
Gropp et al 
(2013) 
Supervisory ratios Concentration 
(control) and 
guarantees 
OECD country 
banks 
2003 Government 
guarantees 
raise risk taking 
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of competitor 
banks 
Jimenez et 
al (2010) 
Nonperforming 
loans 
Lerner indices Spanish banks 
(by province) 
1988-
2003 
Link from 
interest rate 
competition to 
loan risk 
Liu et al 
(2012) 
Z score and other 
measures 
(provisions/loans. 
Reserves/loans, 
ROA volatility) 
H Statistic and 
concentration 
Four South East 
Asian countries 
1998-
2008 
H is either 
inversely 
related or 
unrelated to 
risk measures 
Schaeck 
and Cihak 
(2012) 
Capital ratios H-Statistic and 
banks/population 
European bank 
by bank 
1999-
2005 
Competition 
boosts capital 
ratios 
Schaeck et 
al (2009) 
Banking crises H-Statistic Global bank by 
bank and 
macroeconomic 
1980-
2005 
Competitive 
systems less 
prone to crisis 
Tabak et al 
(2012) 
Z Score Boone measure Latin America 
bank by bank 
2003-8 High and low 
competition 
enhance 
stability, 
medium 
reduces it 
Uhde and 
Heimeshoff 
(2009)  
Z Score Concentration  EU countries 
macroeconomic 
1997-
2005 
Concentration 
raises risk 
Weiss et al 
(2013) 
Marginal expected 
shortfall, lower tail 
dependence 
Concentration Global bank 
mergers 
1991-
2009 
Merged banks 
have a greater 
impact on 
systemic risk 
Yeyati and 
Micco 
(2007) 
Z Score H Statistic Latin America 
bank by bank 
1993-
2002 
Positive effect 
of competition 
on risk 
 
2 Evaluation of recent work 
The outstanding result from existing work is that there are differing outcomes in terms of 
the competition-fragility and competition-stability paradigms. Some papers consistently 
favour the former, and others the latter, while other suggest that the outcome may differ 
between countries with structural and regulatory factors or even the level of competition 
itself. 
The studies cited generally use data of an earlier period than is now available and this is 
illustrated in the above table. Accordingly, we are able to undertake new investigations 
simply by extending the dataset, not only via Bankscope up to 2012 but the new wave of the 
World Bank Regulation and Supervision database (2011, see Barth et al (2012) and Cihak et 
al (2012)). 
Indeed CEPR (2010) note that many results in the literature might be driven by the trend to 
consolidation in the Great Moderation and/or may not hold in times of systemic global 
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distress. Competitive systems might foster stability in normal times, for example, but 
contribute to bubbles, herding behaviour and use of untested innovations in booms, and 
credit crunches in times of recession or crisis. This implies a possible distinction between 
long run and short run effects of competition as well as pre and post crisis that we test in our 
work. The competition-stability and competition-fragility paradigms might both be valid, but 
over different horizons and in varying circumstances. 
Equally, competition may not have been the key factor underlying risk taking in the Great 
Moderation – it might rather have been the global liquidity glut and regulatory easing from 
Basel II as well as disaster myopia (measured for example by the time since the last crisis, as 
shown for East Asian banks by Craig et al 2006) and risk taking incentives from too-big-to-
fail. This can be tested by the significance of competition as a determinant or risk in our 
regressions. Furthermore, the broad issue of incentives has been little applied in this field 
although Gropp et al (2013) is an exception. 
In this context, a possible reconciliation of the competition-fragility and competition-stability 
approaches is that the former is characteristic of banking systems that have been recently 
deregulated, as was the case of the US in the original franchise value study by Keeley (1990). 
But as time passes the banks become habituated to a deregulated system and the level 
competition becomes synonymous with stability. Whereas this argument is clearly not fully 
consistent with the 2000-7 boom, it could be that the underlying relation is overlaid by these 
additional factors and this can be tested. Again, a corollary may be that the established level 
of competition is consistent with stability but abrupt changes in competition (as occurred for 
example after deregulation, but also during periods of prolonged boom or financial 
innovation) may have a negative impact, i.e. again there is a static-dynamic distinction that 
has not been tested in the literature to date. 
Furthermore, most existing studies are based on global samples. As in Barrell et al (2010) 
and Davis, Karim and Liadze (2011) we question whether this is the best approach for 
detecting the competition-risk trade-off since the behaviour of advanced countries (as in the 
EU) may differ from emerging market economies. Indeed it is telling that in one of the most 
recent studies it was shown that “an increase in competition is associated with a larger rise 
in banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, 
better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective 
systems of credit information sharing” some of which are advanced country characteristics 
(Beck et al 2013 :219). EU countries also have a more homogeneous regulatory framework 
than a global sample, which helps eliminate one cause of variation in the competition-
stability trade-off.2  
There has not been much discussion in the recent literature of macroprudential policies, for 
example how the use of new instruments (such as LTV limits) might relate to competition. 
                                                     
2 In Figure 2 of Beck et al (2013), all EU countries other than Latvia and Luxembourg have a positive trade-off 
between competition (measured by Lerner) and risk (measured by Z Score) and the positive effect is significant 
except for the Netherlands, Romania and Ireland (although the significant effects do vary from roughly 0.5 to 
3.0). 
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The prevailing assumptions of macroprudential policies are generally based on the 
competition-fragility link and do not take into account the variations in the trade-off shown 
by the literature survey. Also competition in wholesale funding has not been treated in most 
studies in particular for its relation to risk (one exception is Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga 
2010). Studies typically focus on the banking system in a country (or country-by-country) per 
se. There may be intensive securities market competition, and/or from shadow banking, that 
may interact with bank risk taking and competition in countries with more diverse financial 
systems. Hence it is at least important to include indicators of securities market activity as a 
control variable. 
3 Data 
We use data from Bankscope for the European Union countries, which ensure a degree of 
commonality in terms of the regulatory framework. In particular controls on entry should be 
low helping to ensure a degree of contestability, while common minimum prudential 
standards are enforced across the Union. We include commercial, savings, cooperative and 
mortgage banks but not investment banks in our sample. This is in line with Schaeck and 
Cihak (2012) who tested commercial banks versus a wider sample (not including mortgage 
banks, however) and concluded “constraining the sample to profit maximising institutions 
although justified on theoretical grounds is not necessary for the empirical tests” (ibid: 838). 
There are 6008 banks from the 27 EU countries over the period 1998-2012, thus including 
substantial periods of time both before and after the crisis. Usable observations are typically 
around 45,000 in number (details of regression data are shown in Appendix 1). Regression 
data using variables drawn from Bankscope are Winsorised at the 1% level (as is common in 
the literature, see for example Anginer et al 2012). 
Supplementing the Bankscope data we use macroeconomic data from the World Bank 
Financial Structure database (Cihak et al 2012), which covers the period 1998-2011 of our 
sample. In particular, this provides us with data on stock market value traded/GDP to show 
the degree of securities market competition faced by banks. Equally, we have available 
dummies for the legal origin of the country as in La Porta et al’s revised dataset (2007). 
Furthermore, we employ data from the World Bank surveys of bank regulation and 
supervision that took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, and which are summarised in 
indices from Barth et al (2012).3 Potentially relevant data include particularly activity 
restrictions, limits on foreign banks, fraction of applications denied, initial capital stringency, 
overall index for capital regulation, supervisory power, supervision index, multiple 
supervisors, private monitoring index, moral hazard index, percent of foreign banks and 
external governance index. For discussion see Barth et al (2006). We construct a time series 
for these data as in Beck et al (2013), taking each observation to hold for the preceding year 
and the two following years.  
4 Methodology 
                                                     
3 The indices are downloadable from http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm 
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We initially estimate the revenue functions for the Panzar-Rosse H Statistic for the EU and 
each EU country. According to this approach, market power is measured by the extent to 
which changes in factor prices are reflected in revenues. With perfect competition, and 
when banks operate at their long run equilibrium, a proportional increase in factor prices 
(including the interest rate on liabilities) induces an equiproportional change in gross 
revenues; output does not change in volume terms, while the output price rises to the same 
extent as the input price (i.e. demand is perfectly elastic). On the other hand, under 
monopolistic competition or where potential entry leads to a contestable markets 
equilibrium, revenues will increase less than proportionally, as the demand for banking 
products facing individual banks is inelastic (see Tirole, 1988). In the limiting case of 
monopoly there may be no response or even a negative response of gross revenues to 
changes in input costs.  
Following Bikker et al (2012) and in line with Panzar and Rosse (1987) we use an unscaled 
revenue function. Bikker et al (ibid) have shown that forms of scaling (such as including 
assets or equity on the right hand side) or use of a price and not revenue variable on the left 
(revenue scaled by assets for example) provide an upward bias in the H-statistic (i.e. 
imperfect competition is rejected too frequently). After extensive testing using 100,000 
observations on 17,000 banks in 63 countries over 1994-2004, they found that price and 
scaled revenue functions cannot identify imperfect competition in the way unscaled revenue 
functions can and that “this conclusion disqualifies a number of studies since they apply a 
Panzar-Rosse test based on a price function or scaled revenue function” (ibid: 1016). 
Accordingly, our estimating equation is as follows: 
Log Rit= ΣJ(j=1) αj Log wj it + ΣN(n=1)γn Log X nit + εit   (1) 
 
For t=1,T, where T is the number of periods observed and i=1,I, where I is the total number 
of banks. Subscripts i and t refer therefore to bank i at time t. Rit is unscaled gross interest 
revenues. In our case, we have J=3 inputs so that wit is a 3-dimensional vector of factor 
prices (log interest expense to total debt funding (IED), log personnel expenses to total 
assets (PTA), log other costs as a proportion of fixed assets(OCF)), consistently with the 
intermediation approach to banking output measurement where bank liabilities are inputs 
to produce loans and other earning assets. Xit is a vector of exogenous and bank-specific 
variables that may shift the cost and revenue schedule (business mix). In this context, we 
have N=4, log loans as a proportion of assets (LAR) showing credit risk (with an expected 
positive sign as banks compensate for risk); log other nonearning assets to total assets (OTA) 
reflecting asset composition; log customer deposits as a proportion of deposits plus money 
market liabilities (CDT) showing liquidity risk (but whose sign is ambiguous); and log equity 
to total assets (ETA) showing leverage and hence risk preference, (expected to have a 
negative sign). 
We estimate the H-statistic for the EU as a whole and for each individual country. The time 
periods for evaluating H are the full data sample 1998-2012, separately before and after the 
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crisis (1998-2006 and 2007-2012) and annual cross section observations as in Schaeck and 
Cihak (2012) to be used in our second stage regressions. For the annual cross section 
regressions we take the restriction that there should be at least 12 banks per year. We also 
undertake the test for market equilibrium using the ROA on the left hand side and testing 
whether the H-ROA sum of elasticities on inputs is zero. This seeks to verify that input prices 
are not correlated with industry returns. We estimate using the “within” estimator with both 
bank and year fixed effects in line with De Bandt and Davis (2001) as well as pooled feasible 
generalised least squares (FGLS) using the White method to reduce the impact of 
heteroskedasticity.  
In the following section, we then relate this annual competition variable to indicators of 
bank and systemic risk controlling for relevant variables. Our core results, in line with the 
bulk of the literature, link sector wide competition each year to the log of the Z-Score for 
individual banks, which is defined as the return on assets plus leverage ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on assets over three years. As noted by Lui et al (2013) it is 
appropriate to log the Z score as the level is highly skewed while the log is normally 
distributed. We assessed H both in terms of levels and differences so as to distinguish 
between levels of competition and the change in competition – which to our knowledge has 
not been done in the literature, and may capture important distinctions between long run 
and dynamic aspects. The current difference of H (i.e. Ht-Ht-1) is complemented by levels of 
Ht-2 and Ht-3, thus avoiding overlap between levels and differences and possible false 
conclusions. As H is a country wide variable we did not consider it would be correlated with 
bank level risk, and accordingly did not instrument the current difference. 
We ran three sets of estimates, with bank-level variables only, with bank level variables and 
country dummies and with additional macro-level control variables. In each case we seek to 
shadow “best practice” in Beck et al (2013).  
Log Zit= a0 Δ H jt + a1 H jt-2 + a2 H jt-3 + a3 CDT it-1 +a4 LAR it-1 + a5 NIR it-1 +a6 log (TA) it-1 + a7 (PII) 
it-1 +a8 Δ log (TA) it-1 + a9 SMT jt +a10 CSI jt + a11 ACT jt +a12 LO jt + εit     
        (2) 
Accordingly, besides H, bank level variables in the risk function are deposits as a share of 
short term funding (CDT), loan/asset ratio (LAR), ratio of noninterest revenue/interest 
revenue (NIR), bank size (log TA), provisions/interest income (PII) and growth rate of assets 
(d log TA). All bank specific variables (denoted i) are lagged one year to avoid simultaneity.  
As regards macro level control variables (denoted j), after testing, apart from H we 
controlled for stock market turnover (SMT) which indicates the scope for securities market 
financing, and in terms of regulation, capital stringency (CSI), and activity restrictions (ACT), 
as well as legal origin (LO). Since EU regulations are relatively homogeneous we do not 
expect to find major effects of regulation per se in our work.4 We estimated again using the 
within estimator with year fixed effects as well as pooled feasible generalised least squares 
                                                     
4 Indeed, Liu et al (2013) in a study of EU risk and competition going down to regional level omit any regulatory 
controls from their work. 
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(FGLS) hence using the White (1980) method to reduce the impact of heteroskedasticity. 
Given use of lags for bank specific variables we contend that this approach is more 
appropriate and reliable than GMM. 
In a cross checking section, we then estimated the Lerner index for the EU as a whole 
following Anginer and Demirguc Kunt (2012) and tested it as a competition indicator. 
Accordingly we first estimate the following translog cost function: 
log(Cit) = α + β1log(Qit) + β2(log(Qit))2 + β3log(W1,it) + β4log(W2,it) + β5log(W3,it)  
+β6log(Qit)log(W1,it) + β7log(Qit)log(W2,it) + β8log(Qit)log(W3,it)  
+ β9(log(W1,it))2 + β10(log(W2,it))2 + β11(log(W3,it))2 + β12log(W1,it) log(W2,it)  
+ β13log(W1,it) log(W3,it) + β14log(W2,it)log(W3,it) + ΘYear Dummies  + εit        (3) 
 
Where Cit is total costs; Qit is the quantity of output and is measured as total assets; W1,it is 
the ratio of interest expenses to the sum of total deposits and money market funding. W2,it is 
measured as personnel expenses divided by total assets. W3,it is the ratio of administrative 
and other operating expenses to total assets. Having estimated this equation we impose the 
following restrictions again in line with the earlier authors, to ensure homogeneity of degree 
one in input prices: 
β3+β4+β5 = 1; β6+β7+β8 = 0; β9+β12+β13 = 0; β10+β12+β14 = 0; β11+β13+β14 = 0      (4) 
 
We then use the coefficient estimates from the previous regression to estimate marginal cost for 
bank i in calendar year t: 
MCit = δCit/δQit = Cit/Qit × [β1 + 2×β2×log(Qit) + β6×log(W1,it) + β7×log(W2,it) + β8×log(W3,it)]   (5) 
 
And the Lerner index for each bank-year is: 
Lernerit = (Pit - MCit) / Pit    (6) 
 
where, Pit is the price of assets and is equal to the ratio of total revenue to total assets. This index 
was tested similarly to H and the reasons for any differences in results was probed. Since Lerner is 
a bank level variable there is a risk of simultaneity with the Z Score and accordingly we 
instrumented the current difference of Lerner as highlighted below. 
We note that the literature in the area of competition and risk in banking has virtually no reference 
to panel unit roots, which likely relates to the fact that the time dimension T is small while the 
number of cross sections N is very large, while most panel unit root testing focuses on T and N of 
reasonable size as in a cross country macro dataset. Suffice to note that we did run tests for 
stationarity of the key variables (log Z score at a bank level, H at a country level and Lerner at a 
bank level) and found that they were stationary on the principal tests (Levin-Lin-Chu, Im-Pesaran-
Shin, Fisher ADF and Fisher PP). This justifies our specification with for example the level of the 
dependent variable. 
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Finally, as a robustness check, we ran the various regressions with an alternative measure of risk 
which is impaired loans as a proportion of total loans. In bank-dominated systems as in much of the 
EU this is a fairly accurate measure of risk for all but the largest banks (which hold proportionately 
more securities). There were however much less observations especially before 2007 which made the 
earlier estimates relatively unreliable. 
5 Results for H statistic 
We show below a typical result for Panzar-Rosse, namely those for the EU as a whole. 
Table 2: Panzar Rosse estimates for the EU – log total interest revenue 1998-2012 
 Variable Coeff  T value 
C 10.27479 113.7 
LOG(IED) 0.623713 28.3 
LOG(PTA) -0.407000 -27.4 
LOG(OCF) -0.003823 -0.6 
LOG(LAR) 0.212871 16.9 
LOG(OTA) 0.010037 1.7 
LOG(CDT) -0.035373 -2.6 
LOG(ETA) -0.359749 -14.0 
Adj-R2 0.983  
Observations 43490  
Banks 5314  
Memo: H STAT 0.21289 (0.034) 
Note: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected); Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables). Variables are as follows: IED interest expense to total debt funding; PTA 
personnel expenses to total assets; OCF other costs as a proportion of fixed assets; LAR loans as a proportion of 
assets; OTA  other nonearning assets to total assets; CDT customer deposits as a proportion of deposits plus 
money market liabilities; ETA equity to total assets. All variables winsorized at 99%. 
We have 43490 usable observations and 5314 out of 6008 banks can be incorporated. The 
cost of funds variable is positive while the other two cost variables are negative, although 
the “other cost” variable is not significant. Among the control variables, loans/total assets 
are positive, with higher risk boosting interest income; the non interest asset share is not 
significant; the deposit share in funding tends to reduce interest revenue, perhaps reflecting 
generally lower costs of customer deposits than wholesale funds. And as expected, the 
equity/assets (leverage) ratio is negative, as it indicates higher risk preference. The H 
statistic is 0.212 with a standard error of 0.034 indicating monopolistic competition on 
average across the EU. This is comparable to the 0.216 found for Western Europe over 1994-
2004 in Bikker et al (2012). 
The basic results over time for the Panzar-Rosse estimation are summarised in Table 3. We 
estimated separately for the full period 1998-2012, for the pre crisis period 1998-2006 and 
the post crisis period 2007-2012. 
Table 3: Panzar Rosse H Statistics for 1998-2012 and sub periods. 
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H STATISTICS  
  
FULL 
PERIOD 
1998 – 
2006 
2007 - 
2012 
WHOLE EU 0.21 0.29 0.26 
EASTERN 0.05 0.20 0.07 
WESTERN 0.25 0.34 0.28 
AT 0.21 0.29 0.26 
BE  0.13 0.35 0.28 
BG -0.38 -0.09 -0.44 
CY 0.68 0.55 0.09 
CZ 0.57 0.77 0.51 
DK 0.15 0.34 0.25 
EE 1.07 2.02 0.96 
FI 0.95 0.68 0.58 
FR 0.45 0.53 0.56 
DE 0.11 0.22 0.23 
GR -0.50 -0.67 -0.15 
HU 0.01 0.14 0.28 
IE 0.00 -0.28 0.32 
IT 0.35 0.17 0.41 
LV -0.94 -0.08 -0.58 
LT -0.05 -0.17 0.75 
LU 0.17 0.42 0.04 
MT 0.25 0.19 0.53 
NL 0.60 0.52 0.27 
PL 0.29 0.57 -0.28 
PT 0.34 0.20 0.42 
RO 0.17 0.09 0.05 
SK 0.05 -0.04 0.27 
SI -0.13 -0.19 -0.17 
ES 0.07 0.20 0.28 
SE 0.33 0.23 0.34 
GB 0.41 0.51 0.13 
 
Eastern European countries have lower levels of competition than Western ones. We find for 
most countries that there is a fall in the indicated level of competition since 2007, in the 
wake of the crisis, with the EU as a whole showing a fall in H from 0.29 to 0.26. Among 
individual countries, in the UK, the H statistic is 0.51 up to 2006 then only 0.13 thereafter, 
indicating a marked decline in competition. This is also true in countries such as the 
Netherlands (0.52 before, 0.27 afterwards), Cyprus and Luxembourg. On the other hand, 
competition is flat or increasing in Germany, Italy and France, perhaps reflecting ongoing 
structural change. Concerning levels, most countries are shown to have monopolistic 
competition (H between 0 and 1) whereas some Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) have monopoly or oligopoly on average with H below one. 
This is also indicated to be the case in Ireland (pre crisis) and Greece. 
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Turning to the market equilibrium test using the log of ROA on the left hand side, we have 
the following results for Σ αj=0 in Table 4. Most countries are indicated to be in equilibrium, 
in the full period and also in the sub-periods. The key exceptions are Germany and Sweden, 
which fail the test in all the sub periods. Latvia and Lithuania also fail in the sub periods, 
while in the crisis, disequilibrium is shown in Estonia, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia. The EU as a whole shows equilibrium only in 2007-12. We did further investigation 
of the result for Germany and found that for large banks with assets of over $1 billion, the 
market equilibrium is accepted for the two subperiods so it is the smaller German banks 
(which are very numerous and hence have an impact on the sample) which are out of 
equilibrium according to this test.  
Table 4: Market equilibrium Wald tests for 1998-2012 
 Country 1998-2012 1998 – 2006 2007 – 2012 
WHOLE EU 12.8 (0.003)** 9.4 (0.002)** 0.896 (0.34) 
AT 0.807 (0.369) 2.65 (0.103) 0.04 (0.84) 
BE  2.56 (0.109) 2.48 (0.115) 2.26 (0.13) 
BG 4.92 (0.264) 0.071 (0.79) 3.79 (0.051) 
CY 0.001 (0.97) 3.04 (0.08) 47.0 (0.000)** 
CZ 0.607 (0.435) 0.0031 (0.96) 0.632 (0.42) 
DK 0.71 (0.399) 0.766 (0.38) 1.964 (0.16) 
EE 2.16 (0.14) 0.085 (0. 771) 4.85 (0.028)* 
FI 0.02 (0.89) 0.16 (0.28) 2.21 (0.14) 
FR 1.875 (0.17) 0.639 (0.424) 1.02 (0.31) 
DE 136.6 (0.0)** 30.2 (0.000)** 21.5 (0.000)** 
GR  3.07(0.08) 0.138 (0.71) 6.38 (0.011)* 
HU 1.61 (0.204) 1.99 (0.16) 0.0001 (0.99) 
IE 0.226 (0.63) 4.11 (0.043)* 139.3 (0.00)** 
IT 1.13 (0.28) 1.51 (0.22) 5.85 (0.015)* 
LV 6.19 (0.01)** 1.85 (0.17) 3.02 (0.08) 
LT 8.08 (0.005)** 2.52 (0.112) 0.085 (0.77) 
LU 0.545 (0.46) 2.48 (0.11) 0.1 (0.75) 
MT 0.997 (0.31) 0.264 (0.61) 0.88 (0.348) 
NL 3.73 (0.053) 1.18 (0.28) 22.9 (0.00)** 
PL 0.04 (0.84) 4.25 (0.039)* 0.106 (0.74) 
PT 0.106 (0.745) 5.6 (0.018)* 0.279 (0.6) 
RO 1.33 (0.25) 2.02 (0.15) 0.136 (0.71) 
SK 0.409 (0.52) 0.029 (0.87) 0.0003 (0.99) 
SI 1.414 (0.23) 5.39 (0.02)* 9.11 (0.002)** 
ES 0.036 (0.85) 1.68 (0.19) 2.93 (0.087) 
SE 11.99 (0.0005)** 7.47 (0.0063)** 3.98 (0.045)* 
GB 0.52 (0.469) 0.126 (0.722) 0.02 (0.887) 
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Albeit not central to this project, we considered it of interest to estimate also the 
determinants of competition at a macro level as measured by annual H, updating the work 
of Claessens and Laeven (2004), the results are shown in Appendix 2.  
Turning to the relation of competition to risk, which is the core of the current project, we 
estimated year by year as outlined above to obtain a time series for H for each country. We 
then chose to Winsorise H at 95% given that there are a number of outliers resulting from 
the year-by year estimation procedure and the lack of scaling for the revenue function. This 
gives a range of roughly +1 (behaviour in line with perfect competition) to –2 (monopoly 
behaviour)  
As noted, after experimenting with dynamic specifications, we found that the best results 
came with the current difference of H and levels at lags 2 and 3. This also avoids spurious 
results from overlapping differences and levels. This has a natural interpretation in terms of 
the short run effect of changes in competition being estimated separately from the long run 
effect of levels of competition, in line with the discussion in Section 2 above. Note that since 
H is a macro variable we consider it not likely to be highly correlated with individual bank Z 
scores, so we have not instrumented its current difference. We start with work on the pre 
crisis period where a link of competition to risk is most relevant, i.e. it would have offered an 
early warning indicator. We are also aware that since the crisis the competition risk relation 
may be distorted by forms of government intervention. Accordingly a basic Z-score result for 
all countries and the pre crisis period 1998-2006 is shown in Table 5 below: 
Table 5: Log Z Score results for the EU 1998-2006 (dependent variable: log Z score) 
 Variable Coeff T value 
DH -0.03621 -2.0 
H (-2) 0.147965 3.6 
H (-3) 0.115447 2.0 
CDT(-1) 0.202837 3.2 
LAR(-1) 0.611541 7.9 
NII(-1) -0.42659 -17.6 
Log TA (-1) 0.013674 0.7 
D Log TA (-1) -0.26942 -2.7 
PII (-1) -0.91606 -4.3 
C 3.195342 11.7 
Adj-R2 0.077  
Observations 11363  
Banks 2701  
Note: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected); Period fixed (dummy variables). 
Variable defined as follows:, H is Panzar Rosse H Statistic for the country and year in question; CDT deposits as 
a share of short term funding; LAR loan/asset ratio; NIR noninterest revenue/interest revenue; TA bank size 
(total assets); PII provisions/interest income. All variables winsorized at 99% except H (95%) 
Recall that a higher Z Score is an indicator of a less risky bank (i.e. with higher profitability 
and/or capital and less volatile profits). The core result shows that the difference of H is 
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negative and significant whereas the lagged levels of H are positive and significant. 
Accordingly, a change in the level of competition is harmful to banks’ solvency, consistent 
with slow adaptation to change and disaster myopia during periods of apparent high 
profitability. This result suggests that the level of competition per se is not a cause of risk, 
banks can adapt to competitive conditions and keep solvent, for example by holding more 
capital as is found by Schaeck and Cihak (2012) consistently throughout their work.  
As regards the other bank-specific variables, a higher share of deposits in total short term 
funding reduces risk, a result that was strongly borne out later during the crisis of 2007-9 
when wholesale funding dried up (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga (2010) had a similar result). 
The loan share in total assets also reduces risk, perhaps reflecting volatile holdings of 
securities or greater risks run by large banks which have lower loan/asset ratios. A higher 
ratio of non-interest income is negative for solvency (as again in Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga 
ibid), as the earlier promises that non-interest income could stabilize profits were not borne 
out over the data period; again it is large banks that tend to have higher non-interest 
income. The log of total assets is not significant but a rise in total assets strongly raises risk 
(perhaps reflecting adverse selection when assets rise sharply). Finally the ratio of provisions 
to interest income is directly and strongly negative for risk. Results for the provisions ratio, 
change in assets and non interest share are also consistent with Beck et al (2013; Table 5); 
however, on a global sample they find a positive link of size to stability that is not present in 
this EU sample. Note also that Beck et al (2013) use the Lerner index and not H as a 
competition/market power indicator (we experiment with Lerner below). 
We now go on in Table 6 to present results for a regression also with country dummies, 
which hence captures effects on the average Z score that are country specific and not 
explained by other variables: 
Table 6: Log Z Score results for the EU with country dummies 1998-2006 
 Variable Coeff T value 
DH -0.05223 -2.4 
H (-2) 0.135174 2.6 
H (-3) 0.093433 1.5 
CDT(-1) 0.177406 2.8 
LTA(-1) 0.461657 6.2 
NII(-1) -0.44705 -21.0 
Log TA (-1) 0.017725 0.8 
D Log TA (-1) -0.16778 -1.3 
PII (-1) -0.83 -4.1 
C 3.254822 10.3 
Adj-R2 0.1  
Observations 11363  
Banks 2701  
Note: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected); Period fixed (dummy variables). 
Variables, see note to Table 5. Country dummies (excluding Germany) were included in the regression. 
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We leave out the dummy for one country (Germany) as is necessary for identification; 
dummies are not included in the table. Results here are consistent with Table 5 and the H 
results are again significant at the 95% level for the dynamic term and the second lag levels 
term although the third lag is insignificant. The coefficient for the growth of total assets also 
become insignificant in this case. 
Our third main set of results is for a regression including macro variables relating to financial 
structure and regulation, as noted following a search we have included the stock market 
turnover ratio, the dummies for legal origin and the regulation variables for activity 
restrictions and stringency of capital regulations. 
Table 7: Log Z Score results for the EU with macro variables 1998-2006 
 Variable Coeff T value 
DH -0.07433 -3.8 
H (-2) 0.093125 1.8 
H (-3) 0.039929 0.5 
CDT(-1) 0.179137 2.9 
LAR(-1) 0.535173 6.3 
NII(-1) -0.42159 -16.9 
Log TA (-1) 0.012068 0.6 
D Log TA (-1) -0.21118 -1.8 
PII (-1) -0.88838 -4.6 
C 3.552718 12.9 
SMT 0.000752 1.4 
LOBRIT 0.246001 2.6 
LOSCAND 0.111845 1.0 
LOGER 0.080163 1.8 
ACT -0.08217 -2.9 
CSI 0.002678 0.1 
Adj-R2 0.084  
Observations 11340  
Banks 2686  
Note: White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected); Period fixed (dummy 
variables).Variables as in note to Table 5, also SMT stock market turnover; LOBRIT British legal origin; LOSCAND 
Scandinavian legal origin; LOGER German legal origin; ACT activity restrictions; CSI initial capital stringency 
Results here are consistent with Table 5 with the difference of H result significant at the 99% 
level, while the level effect is now significant at the second lag at the 10% level. Again the 
total assets variable becomes insignificant. As regards legal origin, we omit the French legal 
origin as it covers the majority of EU countries, the ones with British and German legal origin 
are shown to have higher Z Scores on average while those with Scandinavian legal origin are 
similar to French (note this is the pre crisis period). The authorities imposing tighter activity 
restrictions have lower Z Scores and hence less stable banks. 
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It is of interest to see how stable the result is of positive H in the level and negative in the 
difference. We show a variety of estimates including the later sub period and the full sample 
in Table 8. 
Table 8: Results for H from different time periods (dependent variable, log Z Score) 
  Basic (as Table 5) Dummies (as Table 6) Macro (as Table 7) 
Basic 1998-
2006 
(1) 
1998-
2012 
(2) 
2007-
2012 
(3) 
1998-
2006 
(4) 
1998-
2012 
(5) 
2007-
2012 
(6) 
1998-
2006 
(7) 
1998-
2012 
(8) 
2007-
2012 
(9) 
DH -0.036 
(2.0)** 
-0.052 
(1.1) 
-0.081 
(1.0) 
-0.052 
(2.4)** 
-0.051 
(1.3) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
-0.074 
(3.1)**
* 
-0.035 
(0.9) 
-0.246 
(0.4) 
H (-2) 0.148 
(3.7)*** 
0.148 
(3.4)*** 
0.11 
(1.4) 
0.135 
(2.7)*** 
0.075 
(1.5) 
0.071 
(0.8) 
0.093 
(1.8)* 
0.072 
(1.8)* 
0.074 
(1.9)* 
H (-3) 0.115 
(2.0)** 
0.177 
(4.2)*** 
0.206 
(3.3)*** 
0.093 
(1.5) 
0.126 
(3.4)*** 
0.115 
(2.5)** 
0.04 
(0.6) 
0.089 
(1.6) 
0.11 
(1.8)* 
Adj-R2 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.1 0.15 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.13 
Observations 11363 28301 16938 11363 28316 16973 11340 23246 11906 
Banks 2701 4219 3607 2701 4219 3609 2686 4130 3432 
Note; additional variables included as in Tables 5-7. H is Panzar Rosse H Statistic for the country and year 
concerned. 
It can be seen that whereas the three specifications have consistent significance for the level 
and difference across the earlier period 1998-2006 (column (1), which reproduces the results 
in Table 5-7), this is not the case for the full period (1998-2012) and the later sub period 
(2007-2012) where the levels effect dominates. We consider however that these results for 
the dynamics are likely to be affected by government intervention in banks and in market 
competition and accordingly contend that the original result remains valid. 1998-2006 is the 
most important period in the sample since after 2007 the crisis supervened, leading to 
government intervention and greater market disequilibrium (Table 4). In 1998-2006, the run 
up to the crisis, a discovery of a positive link of competition changes to risk is most relevant 
for regulators; in the short run there is a need for caution regarding risk when competition 
increases, in line with the competition-fragility approach which finds wide support 
elsewhere in the literature. Meanwhile the consistent finding of a positive long run effect of 
competition on soundness offers support for the competition-stability approach in the long 
run, in line with studies such as Anginer et al (2012). 
We conclude this section with a comparison of control variables pre and post crisis. It can be 
seen from Table 9 (from equations (7) and (9) in Table 8), that there are some changes in the 
other right hand side variables during the crisis period, although most remain stable and 
significant. So for example among the bank specific variables the growth in total assets 
becomes more significant as a risk factor. However, the other bank specific variables remain 
positive and highly significant suggesting the crisis did not involve a complete adjustment in 
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banks’ trade off of competition with risk in the fairly homogeneous regulatory environment 
of the EU. As regards the macro variables, we see stabler banks in countries with a more 
active stock market only after the crisis, while activity restrictions are only significant before 
the crisis with restrictions inducing more risk (in line with Beck et al (2006) and Anginer et al 
(2012)). British and German legal origin countries cease to have an advantage over the 
French law countries after 2007 and Scandinavian ones have a disadvantage in the post crisis 
period. 
Table 9: Comparing control variables pre and post crisis 
Period 1998-2006 2007-2012 
Variable Coeff T value Coeff T 
Value 
CDT(-1) 0.179137 2.9*** 0.138041 2.3** 
LTA(-1) 0.535173 6.3*** 0.540894 8.9*** 
NII(-1) -0.42159 -16.9*** -0.32443 -6.6*** 
Log TA (-1) 0.012068 0.6 -0.01875 -0.9 
D Log TA (-1) -0.21118 -1.8* -0.19247 -2.4** 
PII (-1) -0.88838 -4.6*** -1.56828 -4.6*** 
C 3.552718 12.9*** 3.482258 14.5*** 
SMT 0.000752 1.4 0.00157 3.7*** 
LOBRIT 0.246001 2.6*** 0.027206 0.3 
LOSCAND 0.111845 1.1 -0.34361 -2.4** 
LOGER 0.080163 1.8* 0.107583 1.5 
ACT -0.08217 -3.0*** -0.00887 -0.3 
CSI 0.002678 0.1 0.045932 1.1 
Note: Variables defined as in Tables 5 and 7 
6 Results for Lerner Index 
To compare and comtrast with our results for the H Statistic, we went on to estimate the 
Lerner index showing price-marginal cost margins for banks in the EU. We did this, following 
Anginer and Demirguc-Kunt (2012) by estimating a translog production function and then 
deriving the marginal cost for banks in each year of the sample (see estimates in Appendix 
3). The Lerner index then provides an alternative measure of competition in the banking 
system, with narrower margins tending to accompany a rise in competition.  
A natural comparison with the results above then is to include the Lerner index instead of H 
in the equation for log of Z Score. In the work of Beck et al (2013), for example, the current 
level of the Lerner index is consistently positive, as a high margin indicates a safer bank and 
hence a higher Z score and vice versa. However, we would contend that such a result is 
contestable since as pointed out by the same authors, there is an element of circularity in 
this argument since the Lerner index itself includes the return on assets which in turn is 
strongly related to the price-cost margin as shown by the Lerner index (correlation of 0.5). 
Accordingly, we contend that the Lerner index should at least be instrumented to avoid bias 
from this simultaneity if the current level is used and otherwise lagged.  
Accordingly and in line with our work for H, we included the current difference and the 
second and third lag for Lerner, winsorised at the 99% level. To avoid simultaneity we 
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instrument the current difference of Lerner with the first and second lagged differences. The 
results are as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Results for Lerner from different time periods 
  Basic Dummies Macro 
Basic 1998-
2006 
(1) 
1998-
2012 
(2) 
2007-
2012 
(3) 
1998-
2006 
(4) 
1998-
2012 
(5) 
2007-
2012 
(6) 
1998-
2006 
(7) 
1998-
2012 
(8) 
2007-
2012 
(9) 
Dlerner_inst 0.174 
(0.9) 
0.33 
(1.7)* 
0.41 
(1.5) 
0.4 
(2.0)** 
0.68 
(4.0)*** 
0.75 
(3.3)*** 
0.41 
(2.2)** 
0.77 
(3.7)*** 
0.92 
(3.1)*** 
Lerner (-2) 0.744 
(3.1)*** 
0.67 
(1.6)* 
0.58 
(0.9) 
0.75 
(2.6)** 
0.8 
(2.7)*** 
0.71 
(1.7)* 
0.93 
(3.3)*** 
0.86 
(2.7)*** 
0.77 
(1.4) 
Lerner (-3) -0.3 
(1.3) 
-0.34 
(1.0) 
-0.31 
(0.6) 
-0.29 
(1.1) 
-0.08 
(0.4) 
-0.04 
(0.2) 
-0.18 
(0.7) 
0.05 
(0.2) 
0.16 
(0.5)  
Adj-R2 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.1 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.19 
Observations 10193 24263 14070 10173 24259 14086 10142 19559 9417 
Banks 2298 3795 3179 2298 3797 3181 2291 3706 3061 
Note; additional variables included as in Tables 5-7. Dlerner_inst is the current difference of Lerner 
instrumented by two lags of itself.  
The first difference term is consistent with the result for the differenced H statistic, in the 
sense that given a positive sign, a rise in competition (reduction in L) leads to a decline in the 
margin and less stable banks. This result applies consistently across samples in contrast to 
the dynamic result for H which is largely confined to the 1998-2006 sample, although it is not 
significant for the basic specification in the two subperiods. Meanwhile it is the second lag 
which is generally significant, with again a positive sign implying a long run negative impact 
of competition on risk. Accordingly the Lerner index favours the competition-fragility 
hypothesis in both the short and long run with the latter being in line with papers such as Fu 
et al (2014). 
Hence we have a similar result between the two competition indicators for the impact of 
changes in competition on bank risk, namely that a rise in competition leads to a 
deterioration in banks’ soundness as measured by the Z score (competition-fragility). On the 
other hand, the H statistic consistently shows that there is a long run negative relation 
between competition and risk (i.e. banks in the long run are safer in competitive markets – 
competition-stability), while the Lerner statistic indicates a negative long run relation for the 
same banks (i.e. banks in the long run are less safe in markets with narrower price-cost 
margins – competition fragility).  
As a robustness check to verify this result we ran the basic regressions for both H and Lerner 
(i.e. with extra variables as in Table 5) for a different dependent variable namely the ratio of 
impaired loans to total loans. This has a much smaller coverage than the Z Score, with less 
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than 10000 observations and rather few before 2007. The results for H and Lerner are as 
shown in table 11 below. 
Table 11: Robustness check - results for competition indicators using impaired loan ratio as 
risk variable 
H Statistic 1998-2006 1998-2012 2007-2012 
DH -0.00293 
(0.4) 
-0.00232 
(0.4) 
-0.0098 
(0.1) 
H (-2) -0.00367 
(1.3) 
-0.00839 
(3.5)*** 
-0.00959 
(3.0)*** 
H (-3) -0.0024 
(0.3) 
-0.00831 
(2.2)** 
-0.00845 
(1.9)** 
Adj-R2 0.039 0.32 0.34 
Observations 797 7408 6611 
Banks 365 2033 1908 
Lerner    
Dlerner_inst -0.0227 
(0.8) 
-0.022 
(1.9)* 
-0.023 
(2.0)** 
Lerner (-2) -0.1377 
(6.1)*** 
-0.063 
(2.6)*** 
-0.05 
(1.9)** 
Lerner (-3) -0.00437 
(0.3) 
0.067 
(2.2)** 
0.083 
(2.5)** 
Adj-R2 0.12 0.33 0.36 
Observations 636 5784 5148 
Banks 229 1800 1683 
Note; additional variables included as in Table 5 
As can be seen, there is a broad tendency for the relation of each variable to impaired loan 
ratios to be negative in the long run. The dynamics are less significant than with Z Score, 
probably reflecting the lack of observations in the earlier sample. Accordingly, the data are 
saying that a higher level of competition in the long run (higher H) leads to less impaired 
loans and hence less risk (competition-stability). On the other hand the Lerner results for 
both short and long run imply that the narrower the margin (i.e. the more competition), the 
higher the impaired loan rate (competition-fragility), although this pattern is returned to 
zero after three years in the later samples, probably reflecting cyclical patterns and the 
effect of the crisis.  
Given the consistent differences in long run effects of H and Lerner, we conclude our work 
by investigating reasons for such a differing long term result. 
7 Assessing the differences in results 
There are conceptual differences between H and Lerner as shown by Carbo et al (2009), in 
that the former is a “difference” term (elasticity of revenue to prices) and the latter a 
“levels” effect (the price/marginal cost margin). Furthermore, the H is a macroeconomic 
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index describing the situation in the banking sector as a whole, while the Lerner describes 
the price cost margin of an individual bank.  
We sought to find the reasons for the differing predictions by regressing the level of each 
indicator of competition on the subcomponents of the Z score (ROA, as noted a measure of 
performance; capital adequacy, a measure of safety and soundness and volatility of ROA, a 
measure of risk). This was estimated using a specification similar to Table 5 (i.e. including the 
basic control variables) and a lagged level of the relevant competition indicator, estimated 
over the whole sample (we checked and the same results hold over each subsample as well). 
Results are as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12: Relationship between H, Lerner and the components of the Z score (1998-2012) 
 Lag H statistic Lag Lerner (* -1) 
ROA - - 
Capital adequacy - - 
SD (ROA) - + 
Z score + - 
Note: All effects are significant at the 99% level, other variables as in Table 5. 
We multiplied the Lerner index by –1 so that in both cases an increase in the indicator is 
consistent with higher competition. The results show that both H and Lerner * -1 are 
negatively related to both ROA and capital adequacy. In other words, increased competition 
on both measures is related to lower profits and lower capital cover, thus reducing Z Score. 
On the other hand, we find that there is a difference in the relation to the standard deviation 
of profitability, with H having a negative effect (higher levels of market competition leads to 
lower volatility of profits) while Lerner * -1 has a positive effect (narrower price-cost margins 
for the individual bank accompany an increase in the volatility of profits). The outcome of 
these different effects for the Z score, the overall measure of risk, is that greater market 
competition (shown by H) leads to less risky positions in the long run, while narrower price-
cost margins (shown by Lerner) lead to increased risk. The same results – including the 
contrast for profit volatility - apply in all cases and with similar significance for the two sub 
periods (1998-2006 and 2007-2012). In other words it is not an artefact either of the boom 
period or the later financial crisis. 
A full investigation of reasons for these differences is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice 
to note first that H is a country-wide indicator while Lerner is a bank-specific one. While 
there is a general tendency for greater competition to lead to narrower margins this need 
not always be the case (for example if there were previously monopolists seeking a quiet life 
and taking their rents in terms of inefficiency, Koetter et al (2012)). Numerically it is likely 
that narrower margins lead to more profit volatility since they are closer to zero, while the 
link of profit volatility to market competition is less direct, given the latter is measured by 
response of revenue to input prices. 
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Taking the results at face value, this section overall suggests a need for caution in drawing 
policy conclusions from risk-competition studies without careful consideration of the likely 
impact of a given policy shift. For example separation of retail and wholesale banking or 
certain macroprudential policies may have different effects on margins (as shown by Lerner) 
as opposed to market competition (shown by the H statistic). Margin effects consistently 
increase risk whereas our results suggest that more competition is favourable for soundness 
in the long run. 
Conclusions 
This is one of the first studies of banking competition and risk to take account of a full 7 year 
period since the onset of the crisis in 2007; to allow for changes in competitive conditions as 
well as levels to impact on risk; and to compare and contrast results using two indicators of 
competition, the H statistic and the Lerner index. Findings are as follows: 
Regarding competition measurement, according to H defined using unscaled revenue 
functions, most EU-country banking sectors are characterised by monopolistic competition, 
albeit close to oligopoly; some mainly Eastern countries are subject to oligopoly/monopoly 
conditions. The crisis entailed a decline in measured competition across EU banking sectors 
according to average H since 2007, although this was not the case for every country. For 
most countries, market equilibrium prevailed over the entire period 1998-2012 according to 
the ROA test and also in the sub period before and after the crisis. The main exceptions are 
Germany and Sweden, and some crisis-hit countries in the period since 2007. 
Results for the trade-off between competition (measured by H at a country level) and risk 
(measured at a bank level) suggest that in the short run a change in competition has a 
positive effect on risk , while in the long run there is a negative effect of the level of 
competition on risk. The dynamic effect was particularly the case in the pre crisis period 
1998-2006, while the long run effect is consistent throughout. It can be suggested that this is 
consistent with banks in a post liberalisation environment adapting appropriately to average 
levels of competition but being vulnerable to errors in risk management when levels of 
competition change.  
The Lerner index provides results supportive of the hypothesis that there are dynamic 
relations between competition and risk, in that the change in the Lerner index again 
correlates positively with risk (i.e. narrower margins as when competition increases make 
banks weaker) but in this case the long run effect is also for competition to lead to higher 
risk. 
Decomposing the Z Score indicator, we find that the impact of the H statistic and the Lerner 
index are identical for both profitability (ROA) and for capital adequacy (i.e. components of 
the numerator). However, they differ in terms of the impact on the denominator, namely 
the volatility of profitability (measured over three years). Accordingly, the overall long term 
relation to risk as measured by the Z score has a different sign. The H statistic results suggest 
consistently that in the long run, higher market competition leads to lower risk. On the other 
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hand, the Lerner index suggests that narrower margins which may result from more 
competition lead to higher risk.  
In terms of policy, the work consistently suggests that considerable caution is warranted by 
regulators in the initial period after a rise in competition, since the indicators show 
consistently that a rise in bank risk accompanies it. On the other hand, in the longer term, 
there is a need for caution in drawing policy conclusions from risk-competition studies 
without careful consideration of the likely impact of a given policy shift, given the conflicting 
results for H and Lerner. So for example it needs to be considered what effect policies such 
as separation of retail and wholesale banking or certain macroprudential policies will have 
on margins (as shown by Lerner) as opposed to market competition (shown by the H 
statistic). An impact directly on margins is shown to be deleterious to risk, while enhancing 
competition generally tends to enhance soundness. 
A number of avenues of further research are implied. One is testing of additional indices for 
competition such as the Boone index, and further assessment of differences between H and 
Lerner. What is the relation of the fiscal situation of the government to banking competition 
and risk, given the well known links of banking difficulties to fiscal problems? Furthermore, 
in the past EU banking systems have been seen as subject to excess capacity (Davis and Salo 
1998) – how does excess capacity impact on competition and risk – and how is it best 
measured? It may be important to focus separately on Eastern EU countries, given studies 
such as Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) found distinct results there over 1997-2005, e.g. in 
respect of the impact of entry restrictions. In this context, foreign bank ownership may 
affect the competition and risk trade-off – and which is very important in the New Member 
States of the EU (Berger et al 2009 included foreign ownership and found no effect, but their 
sample was 91% US banks). And as noted by CEPR (2010), is it appropriate to blame the 
universal banking model for risk when investment banks and simple retail banks also took 
excessive risks? Hence testing for the trade-off of competition and risk by bank type may be 
a further extension. 
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APPENDIX 1 – VARIABLE STATISTICS 
Table A1: Variables for H statistic and Lerner 
Variable 
definition/code 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Total interest 
revenue* 
46148 270522 1041025 8541040 744.9 
IED (Interest 
expense/debt)* 
46142 0.027 0.014 2.12 0.004 
PTA (Personnel 
expenses/assets)* 
45189 0.014 0.007 0.053 0.0004 
OCF (other 
costs/fixed assets)* 
45224 2.2 5.18 38.0 0.18 
CDT 
(deposits/short 
term funding)* 
43563 0.78 0.21 1.0 0.02 
LAR (loan/asset 
ratio)* 
43861 0.59 0.18 0.94 0.04 
OTA (other 
nonearning 
assets/total 
assets)* 
43948 0.016 0.023 0.158 0.001 
ETA (equity/total 
assets)* 
43971 0.079 0.052 0.356 0.016 
TOTALC (total 
cost)* 
44971 268570 1034403 8508045 1178 
 
Table A2: Variables for risk/competition 
Variable 
definition/code 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Log Z (Log Z Score)* 32118 3.76 1.06 0.69 6.56 
H Statistic* 86774 -0.07 0.82 1.04 -1.9 
Lerner index* 40706 0.2 0.106 0.49 -0.15 
CDT 43563 0.78 0.21 1.0 0.02 
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(deposits/short 
term funding)* 
LAR (loan/asset 
ratio)* 
43861 0.59 0.18 0.94 0.04 
NIR (noninterest 
revenue/interest 
revenue)* 
46026 0.26 0.44 3.64 -0.06 
Ln TA (log total 
assets)* 
46842 13.6 1.8 19.3 9.8 
PII 
(provisions/interest 
income)* 
44128 0.09 0.12 0.69 -0.26 
SMT (stock market 
turnover) 
83664 106.9 50.7 259.6 0.14 
CSI (Capital 
stringency) 
89392 1.7 0.69 3 0 
ACT (activity 
restrictions) 
81915 5.5 1.74 11 3 
LOGER (legal origin 
German) 
90120 0.54 0.5 1 0 
LOFR (legal origin 
French) 
90120 0.35 0.48 1 0 
LOBRIT (legal origin 
UK) 
90120 0.06 0.23 1 0 
LOSCAND (legal 
origin 
Scandinavian) 
90120 0.05 0.22 1 0 
Note: Variables marked * are Winsorized at 99% except for H statistic (95%) 
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APPENDIX 2: SIMPLE MACRO REGRESSION FOR DETERMINANTS OF COMPETITION 
 
The table below shows an estimate of the determinants of competition in EU banking 
sectors, using annual macro data on H as the dependent variable, and testing down from a 
variety of variables in the World Bank supervision and financial structure databases. We use 
as a dependent variable the average level of H over the three years prior to the observation. 
 
Table A.1.1: Determinants of level of competition (H statistic) 1998-2011 
 
 Variable Coeff T value 
C -0.654387 -1.2 
ACTREST -0.102496 -1.8 
FORBANK -0.006434 -1.8 
MULTSUP 0.436538 1.7 
WESTERN 0.773396 2.4 
INFLATION 0.066618 3.5 
SMCAPGDP 0.005453 1.9 
Adj-R2 0.205  
Observations 215  
Countries 23  
 
Results suggest that stringent activity restrictions have a negative effect on competition, as 
does the penetration of foreign banks (this latter may reflect lower competition in Eastern 
than Western EU countries). Multiple supervisors tend to accompany higher competition 
and it is also higher in Western European countries than Eastern ones. Higher inflation and 
more securities market competition, as shown by the stock market capitalisation to GDP 
ratio also tend to accompany higher levels of competition. We note that banking 
concentration is not significantly related to H at a macro level. 
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APPENDIX 3: TRANSLOG PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
Table A.2. 1 shows the unrestricted translog production function for EU countries, while 
Table A.2.2 shows the result of imposing restrictions of homogeneity in line with Anginer and 
Demirguc Kunt (2012). We estimate across the whole EU using the assumption that 
technology in banking is broadly similar. 
 
Table A.2.1 Unrestricted translog production function (1998 2012) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNTOTALC_Q   
Method: Panel Least Squares    
Date: 09/24/13   Time: 16:33    
Sample: 1998 2012     
Periods included: 15     
Cross-sections included: 5136    
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 40805  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 0.734533 0.080574 9.116265 0 
LNTA 1.254531 0.00618 202.9976 0 
LNTA2 -0.01175 0.000191 -61.4463 0 
LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) 0.887111 0.025083 35.36718 0 
LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) 0.851826 0.015922 53.50112 0 
LOG(OTHERCOST_Q) 0.097599 0.009506 10.26725 0 
LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q)*LNTA 0.002731 0.001067 2.560698 0.0104 
LOG(STAFF_COST_Q)*LNTA -0.01433 0.000937 -15.298 0 
LOG(OTHERCOST_Q)*LNTA -0.0028 0.000559 -5.00306 0 
LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q)*LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) 0.145048 0.002637 55.00973 0 
LOG(STAFF_COST_Q)*LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) 0.086356 0.001253 68.94226 0 
LOG(OTHERCOST_Q)*LOG(OTHERCOST_Q) 0.008301 0.000621 13.36733 0 
LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q)*LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) -0.15108 0.002554 -59.1509 0 
LOG(STAFF_COST_Q)*LOG(OTHERCOST_Q) 0.028868 0.001172 24.62765 0 
LOG(OTHERCOST_Q)*LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) -0.03062 0.001666 -18.3764 0 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Period fixed (dummy variables)    
     
R-squared 0.990389    Mean dependent var 10.63747 
Adjusted R-squared 0.990382    S.D. dependent var 1.72016 
S.E. of regression 0.168697    Akaike info criterion -0.72071 
Sum squared resid 1160.434    Schwarz criterion -0.71459 
Log likelihood 14733.33    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.71878 
F-statistic 150062.5    Durbin-Watson stat 0.266477 
Prob(F-statistic) 0   
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Table A.2.2 Restricted translog production function (1998-2012) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNTOTALC_Q  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 09/24/13   Time: 16:53   
Sample: 1998 2012    
Periods included: 15    
Cross-sections included: 5136   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 40805 
LNTOTALC_Q = C(1) + C(2)*LNTA + C(3)*LNTA2 + C(4) 
        *LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) + C(5)*LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) + (1-C(4) 
        -C(5))*LOG(OTHERCOST_Q) + C(7)*LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) 
        *LNTA + C(8)*LOG(STAFF_COST_Q)*LNTA + (0-C(7)-C(8)) 
        *LOG(OTHERCOST_Q)*LNTA + C(10)*LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) 
        *LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) + C(11)*LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) 
        *LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) + (0-(0-C(11)-C(13))-(0-C(10)-C(13))) 
        *LOG(OTHERCOST_Q)*LOG(OTHERCOST_Q) + C(13) 
        *LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q)*LOG(STAFF_COST_Q) + (0-C(11)-C(13)) 
        *LOG(STAFF_COST_Q)*LOG(OTHERCOST_Q) + (0-C(10)-C(13)) 
        *LOG(OTHERCOST_Q)*LOG(COST_FUNDS_ST_Q) 
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C(1) -1.60908 0.044085 -36.4992 0 
C(2) 1.322094 0.005578 237.0135 0 
C(3) -0.01259 0.0002 -62.8348 0 
C(4) 0.002989 0.012162 0.245797 0.8058 
C(5) 0.850105 0.010301 82.52819 0 
C(7) 0.045233 0.000744 60.76917 0 
C(8) -0.03612 0.000709 -50.9729 0 
C(10) 0.0297 0.00105 28.29305 0 
C(11) 0.013587 0.000684 19.8545 0 
C(13) -0.01808 0.000462 -39.1192 0 
     
R-squared 0.987255    Mean dependent var 10.63747 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987252    S.D. dependent var 1.72016 
S.E. of regression 0.19422    Akaike info criterion -0.4394 
Sum squared resid 1538.85    Schwarz criterion -0.43729 
Log likelihood 8974.906    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.43874 
F-statistic 351105.6    Durbin-Watson stat 0.238735 
Prob(F-statistic) 0   
 
 
